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Notes
California Charter School Teachers:
Flexibility in the Classroom,
Vulnerability as an Employee
Jennifer Hom Chen*
Since the passage of the Charter Schools Act of 1992, charter schools have been hailed for
achieving better results for students compared to traditional public schools in California. In
particular, charter schools are touted for their ability to serve the needs of low-income
students in urban areas. Proponents also assert that charter schools present teachers with the
opportunity to work in a more flexible environment, where they allegedly enjoy greater
flexibility and control over their instructional and curricular decisions, giving them the
ability to innovate and experiment with new teaching pedagogy to meet the unique needs of
their students. However, there is little discussion on the drawbacks that teachers face while
teaching in this “increased flexibility” employment regime. Specifically, charter school
teachers are deprived of statutory protections against arbitrary disciplinary decisions.
This Note explores various legal routes that charter school teachers may navigate to protect
themselves from arbitrary disciplinary and termination decisions. In particular, this Note
examines various statutory and constitutional sources of protection, at both the state and
federal level, and concludes that California due process provides the most promising
opportunity for attaining protection from arbitrary disciplinary decisions. However, several
unresolved ambiguities within California due process jurisprudence undermine the prospect
of its ability to effectively shield teachers from uninformed or erroneous disciplinary
decisions.
This Note’s conclusion provides for an alternative legal framework that would better
balance charter school teachers’ need to be respected and free from completely arbitrary
disciplinary actions, with the charter schools’ need to flexibly and efficiently make staffing
decisions. Indeed, charter schools must be able to swiftly remove teachers who cannot meet
the needs of their students due to their incompetence, unprofessionalism, or other faults. But
at the same time, as professional educators and individuals as invested in their students as
their own careers, charter school teachers should not be subject to the unfettered whim of
their administrators.

* J.D. Candidate 2016, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Executive
Managing Editor, Hastings Law Journal; B.A., University of California, Berkeley. I am extremely
grateful for Professor Reuel Schiller, whose unconditional optimism and academic insight gave me the
inspiration, drive, and motivation to pursue this incredible project. Thank you also to the Volume 67
and 68 Notes Staff, for their diligence and patience. This Note is dedicated to my parents and
grandparents, for supporting my intellectual curiosity and love of writing since I was a child.
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Introduction
Since the passage of the Charter Schools Act of 1992, charter
schools have been hailed for achieving better results for students
1
compared to traditional public schools in California. In particular,
charter schools are touted for their ability to serve the needs of low-

1. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 47600–04.5 (West 2016); Why Charters Get Results, Cal. Charter Schs.
Ass’n, http://www.calcharters.org/understanding/results/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
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2

income students in urban areas. Proponents claim that the success
enjoyed by charter schools is attributable to a variety of factors,
including: (1) greater flexibility in curriculum, budget, and staffing;
(2) greater ability to implement change to better meet students’ needs;
(3) increased accountability as they are subject to review and renewal
every five years; (4) engaged teachers who are empowered to make
important decisions and experiment with new educational tactics; and
(5) parents who are invested in working with teachers to advance their
3
children’s progress.
In addition to being educators, charter school teachers are also
employees. When the discussion focuses on charter school teachers as
employees rather than educators, the conversation then hones in on how
teachers are attracted to charter schools because they “want[] the
freedom to make their own instructional and curricular decisions, and an
environment that foster[s] professional opportunities for collaboration
4
with like-minded colleagues.” Though some drawbacks of teaching at
charter schools are acknowledged, such as longer hours, “less job
security,” and high teacher burnout and turnover rates, these discussions
largely focus on teachers as educators, as opposed to teachers as
5
employees. Discussions related to the employment practices in charter
schools are centered around how charter school administrators are not
bound by the same bureaucratic red tape as school district
administrators, allowing them greater control and flexibility in hiring
practices and professional development in order to ensure the best
6
outcomes for students. However, little attention is given to the other
side of the coin: the tradeoffs that charter school teachers must bear as a
result of this “increased flexibility” employment regime.
This Note explores the various legal routes that charter school
teachers may navigate to protect themselves from arbitrary disciplinary
and termination decisions. Part I provides a general overview of the legal
framework shaping the charter school system in California, and discusses
2. What Should Parents Know About Charter Schools?, NPR (Sept. 15, 2006, 9:00 AM), http://www.
npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6081152 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
3. Why Charters Get Results, supra note 1; see Ctr. For Research on Educ. Outcomes, Charter
School Performance in California 40 (2014).
4. Courtney L. Malloy & Priscilla Wohlstetter, Working Conditions in Charter Schools: What’s the
Appeal for Teachers?, 35 Educ. & Urb. Soc’y 219, 227–29 (2003); see In Their Own Words: Teachers on
Working at a Charter, Cal. Charter Schools Ass’n, http://www.calcharters.org/understanding/working/
(last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
5. Malloy & Wohlstetter, supra note 4, at 225–26; Brian Childs, Charter Schools v. Public Schools: The
Right Choice for Teachers, Certification Map (Oct. 23, 2012), http://certificationmap.com/charter-schools-vspublic-schools/; Adolpho Buzman-Lopez, Study: Teacher Turnover Much Higher at LA Charters Than
Public Schools, 89.3 KPCC (July 19, 2011), http://www.scpr.org/news/2011/07/19/27792/new-study-findsteacher-turnover-much-higher-chart/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
6. Ron Zimmer & Richard Buddin, Occasional Paper, Making Sense of Charter Schools:
Evidence from California, Rand Educ. (Rand Corp.) 2006, at 4.
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the California statutory protections that charter school teachers may
utilize to challenge arbitrary disciplinary decisions. Part II discusses
federal statutory and due process protections that charter school teachers
may utilize as public employees. Part III questions whether California’s
due process protections may offer charter school teachers any safeguards
from arbitrary disciplinary decisions. Finally, Part IV recommends an
alternative legal framework that better balances the dignity of charter
school teachers and their needs, with the goals that the charter school
movement aims to accomplish for the students and families in California.
I. California Statutory Protections
A. Overview of Charter School Regime in California
The California Charter Schools Act of 1992 created California’s
charter school system in order to “provide opportunities for teachers,
parents, pupils, and community members to establish and maintain
schools that operate independently from the existing school structure,” in
7
order to accomplish a variety of student and family-oriented goals.
Namely, the California Legislature established charter schools as an
alternative, autonomous regime of public schools designed to accomplish
seven goals: (1) improve student learning; (2) increase student learning
opportunities for low-achieving students; (3) encourage the use and
development of different, innovative teaching methods; (4) create new
professional opportunities for teachers with increased responsibility over
learning programs; (5) provide parents and students with more choice as
to the educational opportunities available in the public school system;
(6) hold the schools accountable for meeting “measurable pupil
outcomes”; and (7) provide “vigorous competition in the public school
8
system to stimulate continual improvements in all public schools.”
To give charter schools the broad flexibility necessary to accomplish
their goals, the legislature granted charter schools a “mega-waiver” from
nearly all of the statutes in the California Education Code (“Education
9
Code”) governing district schools. Section 47610 of the Education Code
provides, “[a] charter school shall comply with this part and all of the
provisions set forth in its charter, but is otherwise exempt from the laws
governing school districts, except . . . [a]s specified in Section 47611
[and] . . . Section 41365[,] [as well as] [a]ll laws establishing minimum age
10
for public school attendance.” This single sentence in the Education
7. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 47600–01 (West 2016).
8. Id. § 47601.
9. See id. § 47610; see also Human Resources and Employment, Cal. Charter Sch. Ass’n,
http://www.calcharters.org/operating/human-resources/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
10. Educ. §§ 47610–11 (outlining a charter school’s obligations should it choose to offer its
teachers a retirement plan under the State Teacher’s Retirement system. Section 41635 establishes the
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Code releases charter schools from the “red tape” allegedly burdening
normal school districts, giving charter schools the requisite autonomy
and flexibility to achieve their goals in exchange for direct accountability
11
for measured academic results. However, charter schools are still
required to comply with several other laws that apply to district schools,
such as provisions in the federal and state constitution, as well as federal
12
laws governing equal rights, access, and discrimination. These other
bodies of law will be discussed later in Parts II and III of this Note.
Though the “mega-waiver” provides charter schools with a wealth
of freedom and autonomy, this provision also renders these schools
ineligible for the statutory protections that district teachers receive.
Namely, charter school teachers are not subject to the teacher tenure
13
laws that protect district teachers’ job security. California public school
teachers are initially hired on a probationary basis and are eligible to
become “permanent” employees if they are employed consecutively for
14
three years. Permanent employees cannot be dismissed except for the
specific, relatively extreme causes enumerated by section 44932 of the
15
Education Code.

Charter School Revolving Loan Fund and its administration by the California School Finance
Authority).
11. See Zimmer & Buddin, supra note 6, at 1.
12. Frequently Asked Questions, Nat’l Charter School Res. Ctr., http://www.charterschoolcenter.org/
page/frequently-asked-questions (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
13. See id.
14. Educ. § 44929.23.
15. Id. § 44932. That section of the Education Code provides:
A permanent employee shall not be dismissed except for one or more of the following causes:
(1) Immoral conduct including, but not limited to, egregious misconduct. For the purposes of
this chapter, “egregious misconduct” is defined exclusively as immoral conduct that is the basis
for an offense described in Section 44010 or 44011 of this code, or in Sections 11165.2 to
11165.6, inclusive, of the Penal Code.
(2) Unprofessional conduct.
(3) Commission, aiding, or advocating the commission of acts of criminal syndicalism, as
prohibited by Chapter 188 of the Statutes of 1919, or in any amendment to that chapter.
(4) Dishonesty.
(5) Unsatisfactory performance.
(6) Evident unfitness for service.
(7) Physical or mental condition unfitting him or her to instruct or associate with children.
(8) Persistent violation of or refusal to obey the school laws of the state or reasonable
regulations prescribed for the government of the public schools by the state board or by the
governing board of the school district employing him or her.
(9) Conviction of a felony or of any crime involving moral turpitude.
(10) Violation of Section 51530 or conduct specified in Section 1028 of the Government Code,
added by Chapter 1418 of the Statutes of 1947.
(11) Alcoholism or other drug abuse that makes the employee unfit to instruct or associate
with children.
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In addition to enumerating the substantive grounds upon which a
tenured teacher may be dismissed, the Education Code also establishes a
complicated set of procedural requirements that must be satisfied in
16
order to dismiss or discipline a teacher. For example, to initiate the
dismissal or suspension process, formal written charges that specify the
“behavior and the acts or omissions constituting the charge[,] . . . the
statutes and rules that the employee is alleged to have violated, and . . .
set forth the facts relevant to each charge” must be filed with the
17
governing board of the school district. Based on the written charges, the
school board may, upon a majority vote, give the teacher notice that it
intends to dismiss or suspend him or her at the expiration of thirty days
from the date of service of the notice, unless the teacher demands a
18
hearing to dispute the charges. However, the school board may only
initiate dismissal or suspension proceedings in this manner if a collective
bargaining agreement has not been adopted pursuant to section 3543.2(b)
19
of the Government Code. Taken together, these rules make the process
of suspending or dismissing a teacher cumbersome, costly, and difficult,
thus giving tenured teachers a significant degree of protection from not
only arbitrary disciplinary decisions, but possibly meritorious ones as
20
well.
While there is debate about whether the protections offered to
district teachers are excessive and possibly detrimental to the profession
21
and students, none of these statutory provisions apply to charter school
22
teachers. As discussed earlier, charter school teachers have been
intentionally and explicitly carved out of these statutory protections in
order to give charter schools more flexibility to make staff-related
23
decisions. However, as a result, charter school teachers are deprived of
the statutory protections that district teachers enjoy, and are therefore

16. See id. § 44934.
17. Id. § 44934(b)–(c).
18. Id. § 44934(b).
19. Id.
20. A challenge to the constitutionality of the teacher tenure laws in California is being litigated by a
group of nine California students in Vergara v. California, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415 (Cal. Super.
2014). A California superior court judge has held that laws governing the hiring and firing of district
school teachers served no compelling purpose, and have led to an unfair, nonsensical system which drives
new, effective teachers from the classroom prematurely while allowing incompetent senior teachers to
remain in the classroom. California’s teachers unions filed an appeal on September 3, 2014. The
California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision in April 2016. Jennifer Medina & Motoko
Rich, California Appeals Court Reverses Decision to Overturn Teacher Tenure Rules, Huffington Post (Apr.
14,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/us/californiaappealscourt-reverses-decision-to-overturnteacher-tenure-rules.html.
21. See Teacher Tenure Pros and Cons, ProCon.org, http://teachertenure.procon.org/#pro_con
(last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
22. See Educ. § 47610.
23. See Human Resources and Employment, supra note 9.
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highly vulnerable to a mass of adverse employment decisions that district
teachers do not experience by virtue of sections 44934 and 44932 of the
Education Code. The question then remains as to whether charter school
teachers have any protections at all under California statutesor
instead, under this framework, are merely subject to the whim of their
administrators, left to constantly question their job security and their
ability to make a stable living in a challenging profession.
B. The Educational Employment Relations Act
Although the “mega-waiver” carves charter schools out of the vast
24
majority of California laws governing school districts, some hope still
remains for charter school teachers in California’s statutory framework.
Charter schools still fall under the purview of the Educational Employment
Relations Act, also known as the “Rodda Act,” as established by
25
section 47611.5(a) of the Education Code. The Rodda Act recognizes that
all public school employees have a right to unionize and engage in collective
26
bargaining. Specifically, the Rodda Act acknowledges the right of all public
school employees to join organizations of their choice, to be represented
by such organizations in their professional and employment relationships
with their public school employers, and to have a voice in the
27
formulation of educational policy.
In accordance with the Rodda Act, the California Charter Schools
Act requires that the charters of such schools contain a declaration
asserting whether “the charter school shall be deemed the exclusive
public school employer of the employees at the charter school for the
28
purposes of section 3540.1 of the Government Code.” However,
regardless of whether the charter elects the charter school or the district
to be the exclusive public employer, the charter school is still subject to
29
the obligations of a “Public School Employer” under the Rodda Act.
For example, charter schools have a duty to meet and negotiate with
representatives of employee organizations regarding matters within the
30
scope of the representation. They also have an obligation not to
interfere with employee selection or formation of an exclusive
31
representative, as well as a duty not to retaliate against employees for
exercising their rights under the Educational Employment Relations

24. See Educ. § 47610.
25. Id. § 47611.5(a).
26. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 3540 (West 2016).
27. See id. §§ 3540, 3543.
28. John R. Yeh, Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining: The Unholy Alliance, Cal. Pub. Emp. Rel.
J. Online, http://cper.berkeley.edu/journal/online/?p=915 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
29. Id.; Gov’t § 3543.3.
30. Yeh, supra note 28; Gov’t § 3543.1.
31. Yeh, supra note 28; Gov’t § 3543.5.
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32

Act. California courts and the Public Employment Relations Board
have held charter schools to these obligations, regardless of whether
33
their employees have recognized an exclusive representative or not.
Thus, although charter school teachers are exempt from the statutory
protections that district teachers receive, they still possess the right to
unionize and collectively bargain to improve their conditions of
employment. Such negotiations could develop substantive and
procedural requirements with which employers must comply in order to
dismiss or discipline a charter school teacher.
While unionization is available to charter school teachers as a tool
to establish protections from arbitrary disciplinary measures, it is
unlikely to provide effective or immediate relief. Unions have attempted
34
to organize in charter schools in the past but failed. As of 2011, only
35
twelve percent of California’s charter schools were unionized, and today
unions still struggle to affirmatively implant themselves in charter
36
schools.
One challenge unions face is that charter school teachers simply
37
may not want to join or form unions. Teachers at charter schools are
typically younger than district teachers, and often choose to work
specifically at charter schools, where they enjoy greater freedom and
38
flexibility in the classroom, and as a staff member generally. Thus, they
are unlikely to want to join a union, which many believe only serves to
create complicated collective bargaining agreements, wrought with red
39
tape and restrictive rules. To many of these teachers, unions embody
the bureaucratized, limited work environment that they wanted to avoid
40
by joining the charter movement in the first place. Another reason that
unions have struggled to successfully implant themselves in charter
schools is the difficult nature of organizing the teachers who are spread

32. Yeh, supra note 28; Gov’t § 3543.5.
33. Yeh, supra note 28. The Court of Appeal’s decision in California Teachers Ass’n v. Public
Employment Relations Board, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1076 (2009), is an example of a court imposing the
provisions of the Rodda Act, such as the duty not to retaliate, on charter schools. Id.
34. Larry Sand, Teachers Unions Target Charter Schools in California, Union Watch (Sept. 30, 2014),
http://unionwatch.org/teachers-unions-target-charter-schools-in-california/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
35. Arianna Prothero, Calif. Teachers’ Union is Getting “Serious About Charter School Organizing”,
Educ. Week (Aug. 22, 2014, 8:20 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/charterschoice/2014/08/calif_
teachers_union_is_getting_serious_about_charter_school_organizing.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
36. See Arianna Prothero, Calif. Teachers’ Union Sets Sights on Charters, Educ. Week (Sept. 10,
2014), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2014/09/05/03charterunions.h34.html (last visited Aug. 5,
2016); Sand, supra note 34; see also Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and
Collective Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate Relationship?, 30 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y
886, 902 (2006).
37. Prothero, supra note 35; Sand, supra note 34.
38. Childs, supra note 5; Malloy & Wohlstetter, supra note 4, at 225–26.
39. See Sand, supra note 34; see also Malloy & Wholstetter, supra note 4, at 227.
40. Sand, supra note 34; Malloy & Wholstetter, supra note 4, at 227.
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out amongst a network of different campuses within the same system.
These campuses are often geographically scattered and have different
workplace cultures, administrators, policies, schedules, modes of
42
operation, and student populations.
Despite the challenges unions face in organizing charter school
teachers and staff, the unionization movement among California’s charter
43
schools has recently become more active and prominent. In 2013, forty
44
out of the 183 charter schools in Los Angeles were unionized.
Additionally, in the same year, the National Education Association
45
(“NEA”) launched a campaign to unionize charter schools. Moreover, in
January 2015, the California Teachers Association (“CTA”), the NEA’s
largest state affiliate, officially listed “charter school organizing” as a focus
area in its long-term strategic plan, after making only slight progress over
46
the last few years.
In sum, charter school unionization in California is in its early
stages. Whether unionization will pick up in the charter sector is still
47
unclear. Though proponents are optimistic, unions still face the
challenge of unionizing a population of young teachers who favor
flexibility over bureaucracy, and are scattered across separate local
campuses within large networks. Considerable debate remains as to
whether unions will stabilize or weaken the charter movement, garnering
48
mixed opinions in the educational community. Specifically, “the
41. For example, Rocketship Education currently has ten schools located across the southern part of
San Francisco Bay Area in California, with more schools opening in these various areas in the years to come.
Communities We Serve, Rocketship, http://www.rsed.org/locations.cfm (last visited Aug. 5, 2016). Another
network, Aspire, has numerous schools located throughout both California and Tennessee. California
Schools, Aspire Pub. Schs., http://aspirepublicschools.org/schools/regions/california-schools/ (last visited
Aug. 5, 2016); Tennessee Schools, Aspire Pub. Schs., http://aspirepublicschools.org/schools/regions/
tennessee-schools/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
42. See Sand, supra note 34; see also Richard D. Kahlenberg & Halley Potter, The Original Charter
School Vision, N.Y. Times (Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/31/opinion/sunday/albertshanker-the-original-charter-school-visionary.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (discussing how charter schools
sometimes form “‘thin’ collective bargaining agreements that are tailored to the special needs of individual
charter schools” but suggesting that charter schools are reacting largely on an individualized basis to the
changing educational landscape); see also Michelle Ellson, Charter Schools’ Union Gaining National
Attention, Alamedan (Aug. 20, 2014, 12:05 AM), http://thealamedan.org/news/charter-schools-uniongaining-national-attention (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
43. See Sam Dillon, As Charter Schools Organize, Many Debate Effect, N.Y. Times (July 26, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/education/27charter.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016); see also
Samantha Winslow, Charter School Teachers Join the Union, Labor Notes (Apr. 22, 2013),
http://www.labornotes.org/2013/04/charter-school-teachers-join-union (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
44. Tim Walker, NEA Steps Up Organizing Efforts in Non-Union Charter Schools, neaToday
(July 8, 2013, 10:25 AM), http://neatoday.org/2013/07/08/nea-steps-up-organizing-efforts-in-non-unioncharter-schools/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
45. Id.
46. Prothero, supra note 35.
47. Id.
48. Dillon, supra note 43.
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unionization effort raises questions about whether unions will strengthen
the charter movement by stabilizing its young, often transient teaching
force, or weaken it by preventing administrators from firing ineffective
teachers and imposing changes they say help raise achievement, like an
49
extended school year.”
Consequently, the road to unionization is an uncertain, long, and
indirect path to providing charter school teachers with protection and
relief from arbitrary disciplinary decisions. As a result, unions currently
are not available as an effective or immediate means of protecting charter
school teachers. Therefore, consideration must be given to alternative
avenues for relief.
II. Federal Sources of Protection
A. Federal Statutory Protections from Arbitrary
Disciplinary Decisions
As discussed in Part I, the “mega-waiver” does not exempt charter
schools from their obligations to comply with federal laws pertaining to
equal rights, access, and discrimination, as well as a variety of other
50
federal statutes that cover both public and private employers. For
example, charter schools must still comply with the American Disabilities
Act, the Family Medical Leave Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, Title
51
IV and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and other similar statutes.
These federal statutes offer charter school teachers limited protection
from arbitrary termination decisions, by precluding administrators from
basing disciplinary actions on race, gender, age, disability, or medical
52
condition. However, charter school teachers are still vulnerable to a
wide swath of other discipline and dismissal decisions, such as those
based on mistaken facts, or administrator arbitrariness.
For example, consider two teachers, Teacher A and Teacher B, who
are both pregnant and take twelve weeks of unpaid medical leave under
the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Teacher A is fired because
she spoke out at a staff meeting against the network’s aggressive
expansion plans because she’s concerned that resources will be spread
49. Id.
50. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 12; see United States Issues Guidance on Obligations of
Charter Schools to Comply with Federal Civil Rights Laws, U.S. Dept. of Educ. (May 14, 2014), http://www.
ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-issues-guidance-obligations-charter-schools-complyfederal-civil-rights-laws (last visited Aug. 5, 2016); Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for
Civil Rights, to Colleague (May 14, 2014) (on file with U.S. Dept. of Educ.).
51. Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, supra note 50; Handy
Reference Guide to the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. Dept. of Labor, http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/
compliance/hrg.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2016); Leave Benefits, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, http://www.dol.
gov/dol/topic/benefits-leave/fmla.htm (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
52. See id.
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too thin to ensure each school’s proper operation. On the other hand,
Teacher B is fired for taking leave under the FMLA because the
principal was annoyed with having to find and pay for a substitute
teacher for twelve weeks. The FMLA protects Teacher B from
53
dismissal, but provides no relief to Teacher A who was subject to the
arbitrary termination decision. Therefore, although these federal statutes
serve to protect charter school teachers from a limited number of
termination decisions, such as those based on race, gender, and disability,
charter school teachers are still vulnerable to a wealth of other arbitrary
disciplinary decisions.
B. Federal Due Process as a Mode of Protection
1.

Overview of Federal Due Process and Its Application to Charter
School Teachers

California charter schools have been recognized as public school
54
employers. In the Charter Schools Act of 1992, the legislature specifically
55
established charter schools as part of California’s public school system. In
Options for Youth-Victor Valley, Inc., a charter school argued that it was
subject to the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) and not to the
Public Employment Relations Board (“PERB”) because it was a private,
56
non-profit corporation and independent charter school. The PERB
regional director held that because charter schools are accountable to,
and dependent upon, whichever public body granted them the charter,
and because the school declared itself the public employer of the school’s
employees for the purposes of collective bargaining, that the school was a
57
public employer, subject to all of the statutory obligations.
As public employers, charter schools also fall under the purview of
the U.S. Constitution, and can be found liable if their actions violate an
58
employee’s constitutional rights. The First and Fourth Amendments,
among others, may offer limited relief to charter school teachers that are
fired for exercising their rights under those particular amendments.
However, charter school teachers remain vulnerable to a wide range of
other disciplinary decisions that do not relate directly to those
amendments, such as those based on administrative error or odious
administrator motives. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment is most

53. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (West 2016).
54. See Malin & Kerchner, supra note 36, at 929.
55. See Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 75 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1136 (Ct. App. 1999).
56. Options for Youth-Victor Valley, Inc., 27 Pub. Emp. Rep. Cal. 104 (2003).
57. Id.; see Malin & Kerchner, supra note 36, at 929.
58. James F. Allmendinger, et al., The First, Fourth and Fifth Amendment Constitutional Rights of
Public EmployeesFree Speech, Due Process and Other Issues, Am. Bar Ass’n 1 (2009), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2009/ac2009/151.authcheckdam.pdf.
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relevant for the present discussion, because the Due Process Clause may
provide a path that charter school teachers could use to protect
themselves from a broader range of disciplinary decisions.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no person shall be
59
“deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Due
60
process is triggered by a governmental deprivation of property.
“Property” has been defined broadly to include not only physical
61
property, but also entitlements provided by state law or custom. Once
federal due process is triggered, an individual is entitled to some degree
of procedure before being effectively deprived of his or her property or
62
liberty.
In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, the Supreme Court
clarified the nature of the process due to a public employee upon his
termination, when that employee had a constitutionally recognized
63
property interest in his or her job. In Loudermill, the petitioner worked
as a security guard for the Cleveland Board of Education. On his job
64
application, he stated that he had never been convicted of a felony.
Later, as part of a routine examination of Loudermill’s employment
records, the Board discovered that he had previously been convicted of
65
grand larceny. The Board provided Loudermill with written notice that
he was going to be dismissed because of his dishonesty in filling out his
66
employment application. Loudermill did not have the opportunity to
67
respond to these charges or otherwise challenge his dismissal. He was
ultimately fired, and challenged the Board’s termination procedures on
68
the grounds that they violated his right to procedural due process.
In evaluating whether the government’s expeditious termination
violated the employee’s right to due process, the Court weighed the
employee’s private interests in maintaining employment, having notice of

59. U.S. Const. amend. V.
60. Michael Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative Procedure Act: Adjudication
Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1067, 1084–85 (1991–1992).
61. Id. at 1085.
62. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“An elementary
and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is
notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise interested parties in the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” (emphasis added)); see also
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1990) (“[The requirements of] the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . are complied with, provided that in the proceedings which
are claimed not to have been due process of law, the person condemned has had sufficient notice, and
adequate opportunity has been afforded him to defend.”).
63. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542–46 (1985).
64. Id. at 535.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 536.
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his charges, and having an opportunity to present his side of his case,
against the government’s interest in immediate termination in order to
69
ensure smooth bureaucratic operations. The Court concluded that the
government’s interest did not outweigh the employee’s interests, and that
“affording the employee an opportunity to respond prior to termination
would impose neither a significant administrative burden nor intolerable
70
delays.”
The Court held that due process in the employment context requires
the government to provide the public employee with both “notice [of the
71
charges against him] and an opportunity to respond.” The opportunity to
respond allows employees to state their side of the case and provide
reasons, either in-person or in writing, as to why they should not be
72
subjected to the proposed act of discipline or dismissal. The Court
73
highlighted that these procedures “need not be elaborate[d].” According
to the Court, requiring more than notice and an opportunity to respond
would constitute an unfair intrusion upon the government’s interest in
74
efficient removal of a dissatisfactory employee. These basic procedures
serve as an “initial check against mistaken decisions,” to ensure that
there is a reasonable basis to believe that the charges against the
employee are true, and to justify the proposed disciplinary action or
75
termination.
In Loudermill, the Court established procedures that defined the
baseline fundamental due process requirements that public employers
76
must comply with in terminating employees. With this precedent in mind,
the federal Due Process Clause may provide charter school teachers with a
means of protecting themselves from arbitrary disciplinary decisions. If
charter school teachers could trigger the federal Due Process Clause by
establishing that they have a property interest in their continued
employment, administrators would be required to provide them notice and
an opportunity to be heard before disciplining or terminating them.
This procedural requirement may consequently serve to protect
some charter school teachers from arbitrary termination decisions by
requiring administrators and teachers to engage in a dialogue before
reaching a decision. The process may clear up mistaken termination
decisions. Such a dialogue and potential paper trail may also force
administrators to carefully reason through a decision to dismiss or

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at. 543–44.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 546.
Id.
Id. at 545–46.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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discipline a teacher, because administrators would be precluded from
flatly terminating teachers without an explanation.
For example, consider the following hypothetical: Ms. Apple is a
charter school teacher with stellar test results. Assuming the Due Process
Clause applies, the administration would be required to give her
reasonable notice of her termination and an opportunity to be heard,
77
before terminating her from her position. In compliance with the
requirements of due process, her principal calls her into his office for a
meeting. After he informs her that she is being fired, Ms. Apple asks
why. The principal explains that her test scores were below standard, and
that the school has decided it would be better if they hired another, more
experienced teacher. Ms. Apple looks at the test scores that the principal
has referred to, and notices a mistakethe principal has confused her
test scores with Ms. Applebaum’s. She points out the mistake, the
principal realizes that he almost fired the wrong teacher, and reassures
Ms. Apple that she is not being terminated. This is an example of a
situation where a teacher who is provided notice and an opportunity to
be heard may be able to utilize this forum to avoid being subjected to an
arbitrary, or in this case mistaken, disciplinary action.
It is important to note, however, that due process will not always
protect teachers from arbitrary termination decisions, as is discussed in
Subpart II.B. The foregoing example is simply meant to illustrate that it
is possible for federal and state due process to protect at least some
teachers from arbitrary or mistaken termination decisions. Regardless,
the efficacy of the federal Due Process Clause first hinges on whether
federal due process can be triggered in the first place.
2.

Would Federal Due Process Be Triggered If a Charter School
Teacher Is Fired or Disciplined?

The Supreme Court has recognized that public school teachers may
have an “entitlement” or “property interest” within the meaning of the
78
Fourteenth Amendment to retain their positions via statute or contract.
In Board of Regents v. Roth, the Supreme Court established that “[t]o
have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more
than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a
unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of
79
entitlement to it.” The Court qualified that property interests stem not
from the federal Constitution, but from independent sources, such as

77. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
78. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–78 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599–
603 (1972).
79. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
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state law. In applying these principles, the Court highlighted the fact
that the petitioner, Professor Roth, had signed an employment contract
that only guaranteed his employment up to a certain date; the contract
did not provide any promises or guarantees of continued employment
81
after the expiration of his one-year employment term. Because no state
statute or university rule secured Roth’s interest in re-employment, the
Court held that Professor Roth therefore had “no possible claim of
82
entitlement to re-employment.” Thus, due to the nature of Professor
Roth’s employment contract, he did not have a right to due process, as
83
he had not shown he had been deprived of a property interest.
Similarly, in Perry v. Sindermann, the Court acknowledged that “[a]
person’s interest in a benefit is a ‘property’ interest for due process
purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that
support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at
84
a hearing.” However, unlike the Roth case, the Court concluded that
Professor Sindermann established that a de facto tenure program existed
at his school, sufficient to give him a legitimate expectation of job
security, and to in turn create an “entitlement” to his continued
85
employment. Specifically, Professor Sindermann cited a provision in his
college’s faculty guide, as well as guidelines promulgated by the
Coordinating Board of the Texas College and University System, which
suggested that a teacher employed for more than seven years had some
86
form of job tenure. Ultimately, the Court concluded that Professor
Sindermann had “alleged the existence of rules and understandings,
promulgated and fostered by state officials . . . [to] justify his legitimate
claim of entitlement to continued employment absent ‘sufficient
87
cause.’”
In accordance with Roth and Sindermann, California charter school
teachers must demonstrate that they have a property interest or
entitlement to their continued employment under California’s statutory
framework or contract law in order to trigger federal due process
protections. The Charter Schools Act of 1992 does not provide charter
school teachers with any guarantees of employment, or impose any
obligations with regard to their hiring, dismissal, or disciplinary
88
practices. In fact, through the “mega-waiver,” the California statutory

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id. at 578.
Id.
Id.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
Id. at 600–02.
Id.
Id. at 602–03.
See Cal. Educ. Code §§ 47600–64 (West 2016).
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scheme purposefully exempts charter school teachers from the statutes
that would likely provide district teachers an “entitlement” to their
89
employment within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
Because charter school teachers cannot establish entitlement by
pointing at the California charter school statutory framework, contract
law is the only other alternative. Whether a teacher has a property
interest in his or her continued employment depends on the terms of
90
each teacher’s individual contract. Generally, charter school teachers’
terms and conditions of employment are established either through
individual employee contracts, employee policies, or handbooks. Charter
91
school teachers in California are commonly hired at will. As such, they
can be fired at any time for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all,
provided that they are not fired for illegal reasons, such as race, gender,
92
religion, etc. This makes sense in light of the purpose of charter schools:
to establish an independent network of public schools that have
increased flexibility to make decisions as necessary to best serve their
93
students. The ability to terminate a teacher without any red-tape
certainly serves that interest.
Because California charter schools expressly hire teachers on an at
will basis, a substantial percentage of charter school teachers are unable
to establish a property interest in their continued employment for the
purposes of triggering the federal Due Process Clause. Most charter
school teachers face a situation similar to Professor Roth’s. As previously
discussed, Professor Roth’s employment contract did not provide any
94
guarantee of employment beyond a certain date. Consequently,
although he had a property interest in his employment during the
duration of his contract, after it expired he did not have any property
interest in his future employment sufficient to trigger federal due

89. See id. § 47610.
90. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–78 (1972).
91. See John R. Yeh, Perspective: Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining: Implications for
Authorizing Agencies, Cal. Sch. Bds. Ass’n (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.csba.org/Newsroom/CA
SchoolsMagazine/2011/Winter/Departments/Perspective_Winter2011.aspx; see, e.g., Employee Handbook
2012, Aspire Pub. Schools, Nat’l Council on Tech. Quality, http://www.nctq.org/docs/revised
_final_copy_10_3_2012.pdf (“All employment at Aspire is ‘At-Will’.[sic]”); Human Resources, Livermore
Valley Charter School, http://lvcs.org/about/human-resources (“All LVCS staff are hired on an ‘at-will’
annual basis, including teachers, aides, custodians, office staff, and administration.”); Sherman Thomas
Charter Sch., Employee Handbook 3 (2007–2008); (“The School is an at-will employer.”); Trillium
Charter School: A California Public Charter School, 9 Trillium Charter School, http://trilliumcharter.
weebly.com/uploads/1/1/3/2/11327995/trillium-mission.pdf (Trillium Charter School Employees are
employed at will).
92. See Cal. Lab. Code § 2922 (West 2016); Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1100 (Cal.
2000) (“An at-will employment may be ended by either party ‘at any time without cause,’ for any or
no reason, and subject to no procedure except the statutory requirement of notice.”).
93. See Zimmer & Buddin, supra note 6, at 1.
94. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972).
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process. Charter school teachers are even worse off than Professor
Roth. Unlike him, they have absolutely no guarantee of job security,
because their employment is terminable at any time, and need not be
justified by a good reason. Therefore, charter school teachers, expressly
hired at will, are unlikely to have a property interest in their continued
employment. Therefore, they are unable to invoke the federal Due
Process Clause when they are subjected to arbitrary discipline unless
they can characterize their employment relationship as something other
than at will.
Once a charter school teacher signs an employment contract with an
express at will provision, it is difficult for them to later argue that their
employee-employer relationship ought to be characterized differently.
For example, in accordance with the parol evidence rule, a written, fully
integrated employment contract, with an unambiguous, express, at will
provision cannot be contradicted by extrinsic evidence of an earlier
96
implied agreement to terminate only for cause.
The consequences of the parol evidence rule’s negative impact is
best illustrated through the following hypothetical: A prospective charter
school teacher is meeting with her soon-to-be principal, who has just
orally offered her a position at his school. The teacher asks about job
security. The principal responds, “We hope all of our teachers will stick
around long-term and develop professions here; we don’t want our
school to just be another rung on a ladder that they are climbing. You
will probably only get fired if your test scores are not up to standard, or
some other good reason.” The teacher is later given an employment
contract during her prep period and is told that she needs to sign it by the
end of the day. The contract contains an express, unambiguous, at will
clause. Being a young, inexperienced professional, overwhelmed with the
rigors of working at a charter school, she glosses over the clause and
signs the document. She is later fired because she critiqued the charter
school network’s expansion plan at a staff meeting. This teacher is not
able to establish she had a property interest in her future employment
despite the principal’s oral assurances, and would be precluded from
arguing that the principal’s statements contradict the explicit at will
97
provision in her contract.
An alternative method through which charter school teachers may
attempt to establish that their employment relationship is not at will is by
arguing that the contract has been modified since its execution, such that
98
the at will provision no longer governs. An express at will employment

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
See Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc., 139 P.3d 56, 60–61 (Cal. 2006).
See id.
See Cal. Civ. Code § 1698 (West 2016).
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agreement can be modified by a subsequent express agreement to re99
define the employment relationship as something other than at will.
However, vague promises are insufficient to alter the at will nature of the
100
employment relationship, and the modification must be supported by
101
new consideration. Thus, in order to effect a modification, a charter
school teacher must be told clearly and unambiguously that the terms of
his/her employment are being modified such that the relationship is no
longer at will, and that in return, the charter school teacher must give
extra consideration. The likelihood of this scenario occurring is low,
given that administrators have an incentive to preserve the at will nature
of the relationship in order to possess the flexibility necessary to
102
accomplish the charter school’s goals.
In sum, because charter school teachers are generally hired at will in
California, it is unlikely they will be able to establish that they have a
property interest in their continued employment. While some charter
103
school teachers may have other types of employment contracts that
provide a legitimate expectation of job security sufficient to create an
entitlement under due process, this is largely a deviation from California
104
general practice. The result is that the federal Due Process Clause is
unlikely to be an accessible route for charter school teachers to challenge
or protect themselves from arbitrary disciplinary decisions, as they are
usually unable to trigger the federal Due Process Clause in the first
place. However, despite generally being precluded from using the federal
Due Process Clause, charter school teachers may still be able to turn to
the California Due Process Clause as an alternative path to relief.

99. See Dore, 139 P.3d at 60–61.
100. See Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 265 Cal. Rptr. 412, 418 (1989).
101. See id.
102. See Zimmer & Buddin, supra note 6, at 1.
103. For example, charter school teachers at Green Dot Public Schools, a public charter network in Los
Angeles, are currently represented by a union. Their employment contract as of 2006 provided that Green
Dot teachers are not hired at will. Rather, under this employment contract, “No unit member shall be
disciplined, non-renewed, dismissed, reduced in rank or compensation without just cause.” Agreement
Between Green Dot Schools, A California Not-For-Profit Corporation and the Association De Maestros
Unidos/CTA/NEA 16, EDUWONK (effective through June 30, 2006, http://www.eduwonk.com/
AMUContractFinalFY20061.pdf; see FAQs: General Questions About Green Dot Public Schools, Green
Dot Pub. Schools, http://www.greendot.org/page.cfm?p=1751 (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
104. See Yeh, supra note 28.
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III. California Due Process
A. Overview of California’s Due Process Framework and Its
Application to Charter School Teachers
The California Constitution parallels the U.S. Constitution, providing
that a “person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
105
process of law.” However, procedural due process under the California
106
Constitution is more inclusive compared to federal due process. As
discussed earlier, “property” under the federal constitution includes both
traditional forms of property, and an entitlement granted by statute or
107
some other legal source. California has expressly rejected this narrow
approach to due process triggers, and adopted its own unique due process
108
framework.
The California Supreme Court criticized the federal due process
109
framework in People v. Ramirez. Justice Mosk, writing for the majority,
agreed that the purpose of procedural due process was to minimize
110
abuses of governmental discretion. However, the Court rejected the
notion that only property interests stemming from state law could trigger
the procedures that protect individuals from arbitrary administrative
111
decisions. Where administration possesses complete discretion to grant
112
or deny an interest, due process is not triggered. Because of this
narrower definition of “property,” Mosk noted that the government
113
could essentially carve itself out of the Due Process Clause altogether.
Specifically, Mosk was concerned that the government could severely
limit the scope of the Due Process Clause by providing that the property
interest at stake is subject to the “unconditional discretion of the person
114
in charge of its administration.”
The court concluded its critique by stating, “the federal approach
for determining whether a due process liberty interest is at stake masks
115
Specifically, the
fundamental values that underlie the clause.”
framework did not promote accuracy and reasonable predictability in
government decisions, nor did it minimize abuses of governmental

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Cal. Const. art I, § 7(a).
Asimow, supra note 60, at 1085.
Id. at 1085–86.
Sara B. Tosdal, Note, Preserving Dignity in Due Process, 62 Hastings L.J., 1003, 1014 (2011).
People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 626 (1979).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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116

discretion. Rather, this framework permitted state legislatures to
provide administrative agencies with unfettered discretion, and
ultimately increase the risk that citizens would be subjected to, and
117
harmed by, arbitrary decisions.
Expressly rejecting the federal due process framework for the
reasons discussed above, the California Supreme Court established a due
118
process framework of its own. In doing so, the court attempted not only
to address the policies underlying the federal due process framework, but
also to incorporate another unique value: Respect for the dignity and
worth of each citizen as a human being, each of whom possesses the right
119
to be free from arbitrary government decisions. The court established
that even where the governmental decision is discretionary, procedural
protections may nonetheless be required to protect an individual’s
dignitary values, or, in other words, to ensure that the method of
interaction itself is fair in terms of what are perceived as minimum
standards of political accountabilityof modes of interaction which
express a collective judgment that human beings are important in their
own right, and that they must be treated with understanding, respect,
120
and even compassion.

Accordingly, the court explained that whenever an individual is
subject to a deprivatory governmental action, that individual possesses a
due process liberty interest in receiving a fair, unprejudiced decision, and
121
must be treated with respect and dignity throughout the process. The
court held that “the due process safeguards required for protection of an
individual’s statutory interests must be analyzed in the context of the
principle that freedom from arbitrary adjudicative procedures is a
122
substantive element of one’s liberty.” The court established a four-part
balancing test to determine whether due process is triggered under
123
certain circumstances, and what process is due. The test requires the
court to consider: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of that interest if those procedures are used, as
well as the probable value of additional substitute procedural safeguards;
(3) the dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds,
and consequences of the action and giving them a chance to present their

116. Id.
117. Id.; see Tosdal, supra note 108, at 1016 (“In other words, if one of the purposes of due process
is to protect individuals from arbitrary government action, then relying on the legislature to create a
protectable liberty or property interest defeats that very purpose. Indeed, the more discretion an
agency has, the greater the risk that an agency action will arbitrarily harm an individual.”).
118. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626–27.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 627.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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side of the story before a responsible official; and (4) the government’s
interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens additional
124
procedures would require.
The court’s holding in Ramirez is extremely beneficial to charter school
teachers if interpreted the following way: Even where the government has
not statutorily conferred to a citizen a right or entitlement, and has complete
discretion in making a final decision, due process may still be required
whenever the government takes a deprivatory action, if deemed necessary to
guarantee respect for that citizen’s dignity and their right to be free from
125
arbitrary government actions.
The hypothetical introduced earlier, in Part II, where Ms. Apple was
mistakenly terminated because she was confused with another teacher
who had poor test scores, clearly illustrates how this different due
process framework may work to the advantage of charter school teachers
attempting to challenge an arbitrary or mistaken termination decision.
Ms. Apple would not have been able to trigger federal due process, as
she did not possess a property interest or entitlement in her continued
126
employment. By contrast, under California due process, the fact that
Ms. Apple has a property interest or entitlement stemming from state
law is not wholly dispositive of whether due process would be triggered if
the school chose to discipline or dismiss her. Even if her administrators
had full discretion to discipline or terminate at any time for any reason,
127
as they do under the at will provision in her contract, Ms. Apple
nonetheless possesses the right to be free from arbitrary government
128
decisions, according to Ramirez. Under this framework, a procedural
interaction with the decisionmaker would still be necessary to protect her
129
dignity as a citizen and human being.
Accordingly, if administration did choose to fire Ms. Apple, California
130
due process would be triggered. Although the government would have

124. Id. at 627–28.
125. See Tosdal, supra note 108, at 1017 (“On the other hand, Ramirez also appears to state that the
appropriate inquiry for triggering due process is whether procedural protections are constitutionally
required based on a balance of the private and governmental interests, rather than on the statutory
creation of a benefit or interest. In other words, the balance of the interests is ‘separate and independent’
from the terms of a statutenot based simply on the interests identified in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.”). As will be discussed in greater depth infra, this interpretation has not been adopted
universally by lower courts, and thus undermines whether this doctrine will indeed provide charter
school teachers with relief from arbitrary disciplinary decisions. Id.
126. See infra Part II analysis.
127. See Cal. Labor Code § 2922.
128. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 627.
129. See Asimow, supra note 60, at 1086.
130. Again, this hinges upon whether the courts interpret Ramirez to apply to circumstances in
which an individual is not deprived of a statutorily conferred benefit, as will be discussed later. This
hypothetical is intended only to illustrate that under the California due process regime, charter school
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taken a deprivatory action within its discretion, it is still required to respect
131
her dignity and right to be free from arbitrary administrative decisions.
Subsequently, to properly affect the termination, the administrator would be
required to provide her with notice of the charges and an opportunity to
132
respond. And, as discussed earlier, the administrator’s mistake would be
uncovered during his back-and-forth with Ms. Apple, and the decision
would ultimately be withdrawn and corrected. Thus, due process would
have successfully served its purpose in protecting a citizen from being
subjected to an arbitrary, or in this case mistaken, government action.
But, as explained in the following Subpart, there are a few unresolved
challenges that muddle this path to reducing arbitrary disciplinary
decisions.
B. Unresolved Issues Undermining the Efficacy of California
Due Process
1.

Will Due Process Be Triggered Under the Four-Part Test Put
Forth in Ramirez?

Thus far, California due process appears to be the most promising
route for charter school teachers to utilize for protection from arbitrary
disciplinary decisions. However, there are three hurdles that cast doubt
on whether this regime will effectively reduce the vulnerability of charter
school teachers to arbitrary disciplinary decisions. The first is the unclear
probability that a lower court will interpret Ramirez favorably to find
that due process has been triggered in the first place. The second issue is
procedural sufficiency, and what processes precisely ought to be “due” to
ensure that each teacher’s dignitary interest is respected. Finally,
assuming that due process was triggered and charter school teachers
received at least notice and an opportunity to respond, there remains the
question as to whether procedural protections alone will sufficiently
protect teachers from arbitrary administrative decisions. Each issue will
be discussed in turn below.
Whether the termination of an at will charter school teacher will
trigger due process depends on two variables. First, of importance, is how
a court will interpret the California Supreme Court’s ambiguous holding
in Ramirez. There, the court held that “due process safeguards required
for protection of an individual’s statutory interests must be analyzed in
the context of the principle that freedom from arbitrary adjudicative
133
procedures is a substantive element of one’s liberty.” On the one hand,
teachers still have a chance of benefitting from this legal framework by reducing the likelihood of
being subjected to an arbitrary disciplinary decision.
131. Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 626–27.
132. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
133. See Ramirez, 599 P.2d at 627.
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some courts interpret Ramirez broadly, such that due process is triggered
based on the court’s balancing of private and governmental interests, and
134
consideration of the arbitrariness inherent in the existing procedures.
On the other hand, other courts have interpreted Ramirez very narrowly,
requiring that the government deprive an individual of a statutorily
135
conferred benefit or interest to trigger due process.
Under the broad interpretation, due process is not limited to
136
deprivations of statutorily conferred benefits. California due process
would still be available to charter school teachers as an avenue to protect
themselves from arbitrary decisions. Contrastingly, under the narrow
interpretation, the discipline or dismissal of a charter school teacher will
always fail to trigger due process, since charter school teachers’
employment does not stem from a statutorily conferred benefit. Thus,
charter school teachers currently stand at an unresolved crossroads as to
whether California due process may be triggered when a charter school
deprives a teacher of his or her employment. The resolution of this issue
lies in the hands of the lower courts now charged with the responsibility
137
of interpreting the Ramirez court’s puzzling holding. Regardless,
charter school teachers may still be able to use this framework, because
they are not completely blocked from this avenue of relief, compared to
138
the federal due process framework.
Assuming arguendo, that a court will interpret Ramirez favorably to
charter school teachers, the second variable that effects the triggering of
due process under the California framework is whether a court, in
applying the four-part test laid out in Ramirez, will conclude that the
balancing of private and government interests, as well as the risks of
arbitrariness and resulting harm, weigh in favor of imposing due process
139
protections. The outcome of this test will also resolve the second issue:
what procedures will be sufficient to respect charter school teachers’
140
dignitary interests. Given the circumstances of charter school teachers’
employment, it is likely that due process will be required, and that
charter school teachers will, at a minimum, be given notice of the charges

134. See Tosdal, supra note 108, at 1020; see also Saleeby v. State Bar, 702 P.2d 525, 535–36 (Cal.
1985) (holding that when procedural due process was triggered, partly because the petitioner did not have
the opportunity to respond, and because he was not provided with the reasons for the determination, the
determination was ultimately arbitrary, and due process protections were required).
135. See Tosdal, supra note 108, at 1021; see also Schultz v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 206 Cal. Rptr.
910, 918 (1984) (holding that the language of the Ramirez court suggests that due process is only triggered
when a statutorily conferred benefit is deprived).
136. See Tosdal, supra note 108, at 1020.
137. The issue of whether the discipline or dismissal of a charter school teacher triggers California
due process has not been addressed by any California courts.
138. See infra Part II analysis.
139. See People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 627–28 (1979).
140. Id.
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supporting their termination and an opportunity to respond. The
following application of the four-part test supports the likelihood of this
conclusion.
With regard to the first factor, the interests of the private party, it
has been recognized that public employees have a great interest in
maintaining their employment. If dismissed, teachers are not only
deprived of an opportunity to build their career and make a living during
the uncertain period in which they are searching for a new job, but they
also may face difficulties in obtaining subsequent employment, having to
141
explain the circumstances of their last dismissal.
The second factor concerns the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
that interest if those procedures are used, and the probable value of
additional, substitute procedural safeguards. Charter school teachers are
at high risk of an erroneous deprivation of their employment. Because
charter school teachers are generally hired at will, there are no
procedures preventing an administrator from following through with a
mistaken or completely arbitrary dismissal decision. As the regime
currently exists, an administrator can dismiss a charter school teacher
because he mistakenly believed her test scores were poor, because he
misinterpreted her comments at a staff meeting to be horribly offensive,
142
or because he simply does not like her. The imposition of even minimal
procedure would be extremely beneficial in reducing the likelihood that
principals would choose to follow through with arbitrary decisions that
143
harm charter school teachers in the process.
The third factor, the dignitary interest in informing individuals of
the nature, grounds, and consequences of the action and enabling them
to present their side of the story, is not recognized at all in the current
charter school employment regime. Given the nature of at will
employment, administrators are not required to inform charter school
teachers of the charges supporting their dismissal, or give them an
opportunity to present their side of the case in order to avoid potentially
144
erroneous dismissal decision.
For example, consider the following hypothetical: A teacher named
Ms. Orange is a four-year veteran at a charter school. Her performance
141. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 543 (1985) (“We have frequently
recognized the severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood. While a fired worker may
find employment elsewhere, doing so will take some time and is likely to be burdened by the
questionable circumstances under which he left his previous job.”) (citations omitted).
142. See At-Will Employment and Wrongful Termination, Governor’s Office of Bus. & Econ. Dev.,
http://www.business.ca.gov/StartaBusiness/AdministeringEmployees/EqualEmploymentOpportunityLaws/
AtWillEmployment.aspx (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) (explaining that at-will employment means, “at
least in theory, that the employer or employee may terminate the employment relationship at any
time, with or without cause.”).
143. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
144. See At-Will Employment and Wrongful Termination, supra, note 142.
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has never been questioned, and she is well liked by the other staff
members, and all of her students. At the end of the school year, Ms.
Orange is called into the principal’s office. Without warning, the
principal informs her that her employment contract will not be renewed
in the following year, because he and the other administrators did not
believe she was truly invested in the charter school’s mission.
Here, although the administrators have provided her with a reason
for her dismissal, there is no way for her to verify that the provided
reason is not pretextual. There is a possibility that she may have been
subjected to a completely arbitrary or erroneous decision. This
hypothetical highlights the lack of respect for teachers’ dignitary interests
in the charter regime as it current exists. As there is no required process
and therefore no recognition of charter school teachers’ dignitary
interests, this factor heavily weighs in favor of requiring at least some
minimal procedural protections.
The fourth and final factor concerns the government’s interest,
which includes the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional
procedural requirements would entail. Administrators could argue that
imposing extra procedures on the teacher discipline/dismissal process
contradicts the central purpose of charter schools. Namely, that charter
schools were intentionally created to have extra flexibility and to be free
of the administrative burdens that district schools are subject to,
including the arduous statutes restricting teacher dismissal and
145
discipline. Thus, to require administrators to give notice and an
opportunity for the teacher to respond would impose the bureaucratic
restrictions that charter schools were designed to avoid, and impede
administrators’ ability to make staffing decisions immediately, efficiently,
146
and flexibly, to best meet their schools’ needs.
Though charter schools have an interest in being able to
immediately discipline and dismiss unsatisfactory teachers, this interest
does not sufficiently outweigh the other three factors to preclude due
process from triggering in these circumstances. Requiring administrators
to comply with only the essential requirements of due processsuch as
notice and opportunity to responddoes not limit the substantive
circumstances under which a teacher may be terminated. That is, a
charter administrator may still dismiss or discipline a teacher for a wide
range of reasons, compared to a district school administrator who is
bound by the Education Code. Thus, charter administrators still retain
great flexibility to make decisions as necessary to serve the school’s
needs. Furthermore, the fiscal and administrative costs inherent in

145. See Cal. Educ. Code §§ 44932, 44934 (West 2016); see also Human Resources and Employment,
supra note 9.
146. See Zimmer & Buddin, supra note 6, at 1.
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requiring an administrator to provide a teacher with notice of the charges
supporting her dismissal and providing her an opportunity to respond are
relatively low. These minimal procedural requirements could be met
efficiently in a variety of ways, such as through a written letter giving the
teacher notice of the charges and an opportunity to write back within a
limited number of days, or through a meeting between the teacher and
147
administrator.
To summarize, assuming that a court interprets Ramirez favorably,
to apply even when individuals are not deprived of a statutorily
conferred benefit, the discipline or dismissal of a charter school teacher
will still trigger the requirements of California due process.
Subsequently, to effect dismissal or discipline, administrators would be
required to give teachers notice of the charges supporting their dismissal,
and an opportunity to respond. Even minimal due process procedures,
such as the requirement of a written or oral conversation, sufficiently
balance the teachers’ right to be free from erroneous or arbitrary
discipline or dismissal, with the charter schools’ interest in maintaining
flexible and efficient dismissal procedures. The final question that
remains is whether requiring administrators to comply with these
procedural requirements will in fact protect charter school teachers from
arbitrary disciplinary decisions.
2.

Assuming That Due Process Is Triggered and Minimal Due
Process Procedures Are Implicated, Will These Procedural
Requirements Actually Protect Teachers from Arbitrary
Decisions?

Under the California Constitution’s Due Process Clause,
administrators are required to jump through certain procedural hoops to
properly dismiss a teacher. However, given that charter school teachers
are hired at will, would requiring administrators to comply with those
procedures actually reduce the likelihood that charter school teachers
will be subject to erroneous or arbitrary disciplinary decisions? To better
illustrate this issue, again consider the Ms. Apple hypothetical discussed
earlier in Part II of this Note.
Suppose that in compliance with due process, Ms. Apple’s principal
provides her with a letter informing her that she is being terminated
because her test scores are subpar, and that he thinks it is in the best
interest of the school that a more experienced teacher is hired in her

147. Procedural sufficiency is yet another variable that would depend on the outcome of the
court’s application of this four-part test. For the sake of this Note, it can be assumed that minimal
procedures, similar to those required in the Loudermill case, will be sufficient to serve the purposes of
due process. It is possible that a court may require higher or lower protections based on a variety of
other factors.
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place. Ms. Apple responds in writing, detailing that the test scores cited
in the principal’s letter actually belonged to another teacher, Ms.
Applebaum, who also worked at the same school. Upon receiving the
letter, the principal realizes that he has made a mistake. However, being
a new administrator who does not want his credibility questioned by
other school leaders and the rest of his staff, the principal terminates Ms.
Apple anyway to avoid tarnishing his reputation. Despite the fact that
the principal has complied with the requirements of due process, Ms.
Apple is still fired for an arbitrary reason.
The above hypothetical reveals a gap between the purposes
underlying procedural due process and the ability of these procedures to
accomplish their intended goals in the charter school employment
context. Namely, it calls into question whether the imposition of
procedural requirements will actually be useful in protecting charter
school teachers from arbitrary decisions, primarily because of their at
will employment status. The imposition of procedural requirements still
imposes no direct restrictions on the reasons, or lack thereof, for which a
principal can dismiss a teacher. Thus, so long as the administrator first
complies with the procedures required by California due process, he can
still discipline or dismiss a charter school teacher for an arbitrary reason,
or even a mistaken reason, if he so wishes. Fortunately, Justice Marshall
provides helpful guidance in his dissent in Board of Regents of State
Colleges v. Roth, where he addresses a similar critique of the
effectiveness of procedural due process in reducing the likelihood of
148
arbitrariness in administrative decisions.
In his dissent, Justice Marshall acknowledges that purely procedural
requirements could be viewed as “useless act[s]” because a state entity
“bent on denying employment . . . will do so regardless of the procedural
149
hurdles that are placed in its path.” He concedes the validity of this
perspective to an extent. However, he also emphasizes that procedural
protections ultimately stem from a substantive right of all citizens to have
a government that acts reasonably and fairly; a government that makes
150
decisions based on merit. Justice Marshall points out that in vindicating
this substantive right, “a requirement of procedural regularity at least
renders arbitrary action more difficult. Moreover, proper procedures will
surely eliminate some of the arbitrariness that results, not from malice,
151
but from innocent error.”
Ultimately, Justice Marshall counters the argument that procedural
requirements are completely “useless” by articulating that when the

148.
149.
150.
151.

Roth, 408 U.S. at 591 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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government is aware that it may have to justify its decisions with sound
reasons, it is more likely to be cautious, careful, and correct in its
152
decisionmaking, even if it possesses discretion throughout the process.
He voices that procedural requirements do at least two things: (1) protect
citizens by reducing the likelihood that the government will act in a truly
arbitrary fashion; and (2) benefit the government by ensuring that its
reputation is not tainted by improper or erroneous decisions that
153
otherwise go unchecked.
Justice Marshall’s analysis in his Roth dissent addresses the concern
raised by the Ms. Apple hypothetical, to an extent. Indeed, charter
administrators still possess the discretion to dismiss a teacher for
completely arbitrary or erroneous reasons, so long as they provide notice
and give the teacher an opportunity to respond. However, given that
they are obligated to explain their reasoning to the teacher and/or
provide a paper trail tracking their dismissal decision, they will be less
inclined to exercise their discretion so expansively. For example, the
administrator in the Ms. Apple hypothetical could still fire her after
discovering his mistake if he is too embarrassed to admit his gaffe to the
rest of his staff; she is hired at will, after all. However, because the
administrator is aware of his obligation to inform Ms. Apple that the
reason for her dismissal is his embarrassment, he may be less likely to
follow through with that decision. He may decide he would rather not
deal with the social or reputational consequences of the decisionthat
his staff and the community would lose respect for him as a school
leaderor he may not want to put in the effort to find a different,
legitimate reason for dismissing her. Consequently, while it is possible for
an administrator to dismiss a teacher erroneously or arbitrarily despite
being subject to due process requirements and having an opportunity to
154
self-correct, the chance of this actually happening is unlikely.
In light of the foregoing analysis, California due process appears to
be the most promising legal doctrine to protect charter school teachers
from arbitrary disciplinary decisions for several reasons. First, unlike the
federal framework, charter school teachers are not automatically
152. Id.
153. Id. (where Justice Marshall also argues, in essence, that all individuals have a substantive right
to be employed by the government, and that procedural due process stems from the existence of those
substantive rights). This Note is not adopting Justice Marshall’s argument in full; rather, only to the
extent that procedure alone may have a substantial impact on a government’s decisionmaking process,
and nonetheless protect citizens from arbitrary decisions.
154. See Characteristics of Public School Districts in the United States: Results from 2007-08 Schools and
Staffing Survey, Nat’l. Ctr. For Educ. Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009320/tables/sass0708_
2009320_d1n_08.asp (last visited Aug. 5, 2016); see also Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Principals Given Flexibility
in Firing Teachers Showed They Could Evaluate Well, Study Indicates, Chicago Tribune (July 19, 2011),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-07-19/news/ct-met-cps-study-principals-20110719_1_fire-teachersprobationary-teachers-principals.
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precluded from triggering due process, given California’s more expansive
due process trigger structure. Second, once triggered, due process would
better protect teachers from erroneous or mistaken dismissal decisions,
by guaranteeing an opportunity to understand the charges underlying
their dismissal and to clarify any misunderstandings or mistakes.
Subsequently, administrators would have an opportunity to self-correct
and avoid the improper dismissal altogether. Third, although procedural
requirements would not substantively preclude administrators from
making arbitrary disciplinary decisions, they will reduce their likelihood
of occurrence. Administrators may be more hesitant to act upon
arbitrary tendencies when they are required to create a paper trail and
provide the teacher with notice of the reasons underlying termination, as
schools have an interest in maintaining a positive, fair reputation as a
public employer.
However, two issues cast a shadow upon whether California due
process will effectively protect charter school teachers from arbitrary
disciplinary decisions. The first problem is that the initial application of
this framework to charter school teachers depends on the way Ramirez is
interpreted in each particular case. Some courts have interpreted
Ramirez to establish a separate right to be free from arbitrary
administrative decisions, regardless of whether a statutory right has been
conferred. But, other courts have not, and have required the existence of
a statutory right to trigger California due process. The second
substantive flaw in this system is that its effectiveness relies primarily on
the administrators’ good faith. That is, the system operates on the
assumption that administrators self-correct when mistakes underlying
dismissal surface, and that administrators are deterred from making truly
arbitrary decisions as a result of having to comply with the requisite due
process procedures. While it is reasonable and practical to assume that
administrators generally will act in good faith, the California due process
system nonetheless lacks “teeth” in the sense that it is still entirely
possible that an administrator “bent on denying employment will do so
regardless of the procedural hurdles that are placed in [his or her
155
path].”
In short, California due process is the most promising bridge for
charter school teachers to cross in attaining protection from arbitrary
disciplinary decisions. This framework makes significant headway in
creating an employment regime that balances not only the charter
schools’ need to flexibly and efficiently make staffing-related decisions to
serve its students, but also addresses the teachers’ need to be safe and
secure from arbitrary and odious dismissal decisions. But, because it is
wrought by two noteworthy, substantive shortcomings, its effectiveness
155. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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in shielding teachers from the whim of their administrators remains in
question.
With the lessons of Parts I, II, and III in mind, Part IV now proposes
and evaluates steps that the California Legislature may take to more
affirmatively protect charter school teachers from arbitrary disciplinary
decisions, while still balancing the needs of charter schools and the
objectives of the charter movement.
IV. Recommendations for Reform
The law currently provides charter school teachers with two possible
routes to protect themselves from arbitrary disciplinary decisions:
unionization and California due process. But, it is uncertain whether
either route effectively accomplishes the goal of safeguarding charter
school teachers from arbitrary or erroneous determinations for the
reasons discussed in Parts II and III respectively. Thus, although charter
schools largely retain the flexibility to efficiently make staff-related
decisions to best serve the needs of its students, charter school teachers
pay the price, as they are still fairly vulnerable to being dismissed for
arbitrary, odious, or erroneous reasons.
Meanwhile, district teachers receive significant protection from
dismissal and discipline via the California Education Code. These
statutory protections make it nearly impossible for administrators to
dismiss an ineffective or dissatisfactory teacher absent the most extreme
circumstances. Consequently, while district teachers enjoy phenomenal
job security, district schools may be crippled in their ability to best serve
the needs of their students, given the difficulty inherent in dismissing an
ineffective, tenured teacher.
These two employment regimes represent two opposite ends of a
spectrum, where the competing needs of teachers and schools are not
being met in a balanced fashion. In each framework, one party benefits
to the other’s severe detriment. The statutory protections for district
teachers have recently been challenged through litigation. In 2012, nine
California public school children challenged the constitutionality of the
California statutes that govern teacher tenure, teacher dismissal, and
156
teacher layoffs, in Vergara v. California. Though the challenge failed,
and statutes still remain in place, this attempted reform, by way of
litigation, has brought the debate regarding their propriety to the
157
forefront of public attention. By contrast, however, little advocacy is
being done on behalf of reform for charter school teachers.
This Note proposes two suggestions that would better balance the
charter school teachers’ need to be respected and free from completely
156. See Medina & Rich, supra note 20.
157. Id.
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arbitrary decisions, with the charter schools’ need to flexibly and
efficiently make staffing decisions. The first is that California due process
should be made firmly available to charter school teachers, with
protections akin to those required in Loudermill. But, a regime of
administrative review should be layered over these minimal procedural
protections to ensure that charter school teachers’ substantive right to
have a government employer that acts reasonably and fairly is properly
enforced, with requisite procedure playing an integral role. The second
suggestion is that charter schools should be required to provide teachers
with full disclosure and training as to its employment policies, and inform
them of their legal rights as public employees hired at will, or otherwise.
The details of each proposed reform, the underlying rationale behind
each proposal, and the anticipated resulting outcomes of said policy
changes will be discussed in the following Subparts.
A. Codification of LOUDERMILL-Like Due Process Procedures
with Administrative Oversight
Statutory codification of due process protections similar to those
provided in Loudermill, combined with an additional layer of
administrative oversight, would serve three key purposes. First, this
reform would remove one of the barriers that charter school teachers
currently face in invoking California due process: the uncertainty as to
whether Ramirez will be interpreted favorably, to afford charter school
teachers the relief provided by this framework in the first place. Second,
this reform would provide charter school teachers with reasonable means
of protecting themselves from erroneous and severely arbitrary
disciplinary decisions, while still balancing the charter schools’ need for
flexibility and administrative freedom. Third, requiring administrative
oversight would address one of the fundamental substantive gaps in the
California due process framework: the questionable effectiveness of
procedure alone, when no substantive restrictions are imposed upon the
administrators’ discretion.
Statutorily conferring charter school teachers with due process
protections analogous to those in Loudermill would address one of the
barriers that they currently face in invoking California due process. As
discussed earlier, whether the framework applies in the first place is
dependent upon whether a court interprets Ramirez to require a
statutorily conferred right. However, should the legislature simply
provide that charter school teachers may invoke California due process
even when they are hired at will, this barrier is lifted, because further
inquiry into courts’ mixed interpretations of Ramirez is no longer
necessary. Such a reform would be consistent with the fact that
California uniquely values an individual’s right to be free from arbitrary
governmental decisions, as illustrated by the court’s rationale in Ramirez.
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As charter schools are public employers, this right is always at stake
when a charter school teacher is hired at will in accordance with common
practice. Moreover, the legislature has provided charter school teachers
with similar, narrow statutory protections in the past, such as when it
passed the Rodda Act. In short, this statutory reform would allow
charter school teachers to invoke due process protections without having
to rely upon the courts’ mixed jurisprudence on what is required to
trigger due process under Ramirez.
Under this proposed framework, school administrators would be
required to provide their teachers with written notice of the charges
underlying a disciplinary decision, and teachers would be afforded an
opportunity to respond. But, the process would not stop there. To ensure
that the principal is not acting erroneously, or making a completely
arbitrary decision that does not respect the teacher’s dignitary interest,
an impartial party would review the written record created between the
principal and teacher. This administrative review would ideally be an
impartial panel of individuals, such as a Review Board comprised of
three to five members of the school board, who could review the paper
trail to spot-check for arbitrariness or error. Truly arbitrary reasons
include reasons utterly unrelated to the teacher’s employment. Put
differently, a reviewing board may find that a teacher might have been
subjected to an arbitrary disciplinary decision if the underlying reason
158
bore no connection whatsoever to his or her role as a teacher.
These Loudermill-esque protections, combined with a basic
framework of administrative oversight, would provide charter school
teachers with a reasonable means of protecting themselves from
erroneous or arbitrary disciplinary decisions, while balancing the needs
and objectives of charter schools. On the one hand, these procedural
requirements, with additional administrative review, amply respect
teachers’ dignitary interest and right to be free from erroneous and
arbitrary decisions. By receiving notice and being provided an
opportunity to respond, charter school teachers could prevent erroneous
disciplinary determinations, as factual misunderstandings may come to
light during the back-and-forth. Moreover, if administrators are aware
that they must create a written record of their disciplinary decision, they
may be more hesitant to act arbitrarily, thus reducing the likelihood that
a charter school teacher will be dismissed for improper reasons.
158. Assigning a few members of the school board the responsibility of reviewing disciplinary and
dismissal decisions is ideal for several reasons. First, charter schools are already held accountable to the
school board, who provides them with the charter that authorizes their existence in the first place. Second,
school board members are in the best position to review the decisions with an impartial lens, compared to
actual charter administrators, teachers, or even parents. Finally, allocating this responsibility to school
board members would be cost-effective; it would be financially and administratively reasonable to
appoint several school board members to review the paper file of a few decisions each month.
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More importantly, the additional administrative review would fill
the remaining gap in the California due process framework: the risk that
an administrator may still choose to follow through with an arbitrary
disciplinary decision, regardless of having to comply with procedural
requirements. If a charter school teacher believes her administrator is
acting in bad faith, such as by claiming that her dismissal is due to a nonarbitrary reason when she has reason to believe it is actually motivated
by an arbitrary reason, she could make these claims in her response to
the notice of charges. Under California due process as it currently exists,
her response would only be seen by her administrator, and would have
little impact on his decision if he is truly bent on ending her employment
for an arbitrary reason. However, under this new framework, the paper
trail would be reviewed by a separate, impartial administrative authority,
who may be more inclined to believe the teacher’s side of the story and
preclude her termination. Therefore, this framework provides charter
school teachers protection by imposing procedural requirements and
providing an opportunity for substantive review.
These procedural requirements are favorable to both charter school
teachers, as well as the schools themselves. First, they respect the
interests of charter schools and the charter movement. Second, they do
not impose a high fiscal or administrative burden, compared to the
procedures that district administrators must comply with to discipline or
dismiss a district teacher. For example, a school board majority vote is
not required to give the teacher notice of a decision that the
administrators intend to dismiss or discipline her, and administrators
need to provide each teacher a full, formal hearing upon request.
In this framework, a paper trail is established and reviewed; there is
no need for a hearing, or any other long, drawn-out process that would
impede the ability of charter administrators to dismiss a teacher
efficiently. Furthermore, these procedures do not impose a great
substantive limit upon the reasons that an administrator may dismiss a
teacher. This reform does not propose that charter school teachers only
be dismissed for “just cause” or another ambiguous, performance-related
term, such as “professional misconduct.” Rather, if the Review Board is
limited to checking for error and true arbitrariness, which may entail
requiring that the determination rest on something remotely related to
the teacher’s role as an employee, then charter school teachers can still
be dismissed for a wide variety of reasons. For instance, under this
framework, a charter school teacher may be fired if the administration is
not persuaded she believes in the school’s mission, if she has a poor
impact on staff culture because she does not get along with the other
staff, or if her test scores were poor. Therefore, under this framework,
charter school administrators still retain substantial discretion in their
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ability to dismiss or discipline unsatisfactory or ineffective teachers at a
low cost.
In sum, the codification of Loudermill-like protections with an
additional level of administrative review would address all of the
shortcomings inherent in the California due process framework as it
currently exists. These recommendations also fairly balance charter
school teachers’ dignitary interest with charter schools’ need for flexible
and efficient decisionmaking authority. But, these reforms would be
irrelevant if charter school teachers themselves were not aware of the
paths of legal relief available to them. The following Subpart proposes a
solution to this potential issue.
B. Charter School Teachers Should Be Given Notice of Their
Rights Related to Their Employment Status
Charter schools should be required to inform teachers of their legal
rights under this framework for two primary reasons. First, charter
school teachers themselves are unlikely to be aware of their rights as
public school teachers, as a high percentage of those teachers are young,
159
inexperienced, and unfamiliar with the profession. If charter school
schools are not required to inform incoming teachers of their rights,
charter schools may be tempted to take advantage of these unseasoned
teachers and fire them without complying with requisite procedures.
Charter schools may also misinform teachers of the law by telling them
that they have no rights to organize or unionize, when in fact, they are
afforded this right under the Rodda Act. The teachers would never seek
redress for their injuries stemming from the charter schools’ misdeeds, as
they were not aware of their basic rights. To prevent this circumventing
of the legal system, charter schools thus should provide teachers with
literature on their rights as public employees and public school teachers.
Second, as previously discussed, charter school teachers generally
seek employment at charter schools because they are eager to be free of
160
the bureaucratic limitations that burden district schools. However, their
enthusiasm for flexibility and innovation in the classroom often causes
them to overlook the vulnerabilities that they expose themselves to as at
will employees. Charter schools thus have a responsibility to be
transparent with these teachers early on as to the costs and benefits of
159. See Michelle Exstrom, Teaching in Charter Schools, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures 1
(2012) (stating that as of 2012, “[t]hirty percent [of charter school teachers] were in their first three years
of teaching, and 75 percent had taught for less than 10 years.”); see also Sara Rimer, Study Finds Charter
Schools Lack Experienced Teachers, N.Y. Times (Apr. 8, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/08/
education/08CHAR.html (“Charter schools, regarded by hundreds of thousands of families as an
alternative to low-performing public schools, rely heavily on young, inexperienced, uncredentialed
teachers . . . .”).
160. Malloy & Wohlstetter, supra note 4, at 225–26.
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being employed in this unique workplaceessentially, increased
flexibility in exchange for less job security. Such transparency would
actually work to the benefit of charter schools. If teachers are made fully
aware of their vulnerabilities and legal status as an at will employee early
on, then they will be less likely to challenge a determination that is valid.
Consequently, administrators who properly exercise their authority will
not be burdened by meritless challenges.
In short, requiring charter schools to provide their teachers with
notice of their rights and vulnerabilities serves to prevent further
mistreatment of charter school teachers, and benefits the charter schools
themselves by lessening the likelihood of complicated dismissals when
they are, in fact, supported by law.
Conclusion
This Note’s survey of the law protecting charter school teachers
from arbitrary disciplinary decisions has brought several conclusions to
light. Charter school teachers occupy an odd middle ground between
public and private employment. Charter school teachers have explicitly
been carved out of the protections that district teachers receive from the
California Education Code, as part of the “mega-waiver” designed to give
charter schools increased flexibility and independence. Consequently,
charter school teachers are generally hired at will. While they still have the
right to unionize and eventually pursue better protections through
collective bargaining, the unionization movement is too young and underdeveloped to predict whether it will be effective in improving the working
conditions for charter school teachers.
Turning to constitutional protections, charter school teachers,
though completely precluded from invoking federal due process, may be
able to invoke California due process to require administrators to comply
with certain procedural requirements in effecting a termination, which
may reduce the likelihood that erroneous and completely arbitrary
reasons will serve as the basis for dismissal. But, because the applicability
of this framework hinges upon a specific outcome in the wake of muddy
jurisprudence, it is still uncertain whether charter school teachers will be
able to turn to this framework for relief.
The reforms proposed in this Note aim to strike an appropriate
balance between the interests of charter school teachers on the one hand,
and the objectives and goals of charter schools and the charter
movement generally on the other. Statutory codification of Loudermilllike due process protections, with an extra level of administrative review,
may provide charter school teachers with reasonable means of protecting
themselves from arbitrary disciplinary decisions, while ensuring that
administrators still retain great flexibility to efficiently dismiss a
dissatisfactory teacher to best serve student needs.
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